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INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION: A NEW SIX-STEP PROCEDURE 
Thom Brooks 
 
Abstract. Involuntary intoxication is often misunderstood. The predominant ‘orthodox’ view 
is that involuntary intoxication should lead to acquittal for offences requiring proof of fault. 
Strict liability offences are therefore unaffected. This article argues the law is more complex 
requiring a more careful approach. The article provides a new six-step procedure to determine 
whether involuntary intoxication is applicable and should lead to acquittal.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Involuntary intoxication is often misunderstood. The predominant ‘orthodox’ view is that 
involuntary intoxication should lead to acquittal for offences requiring proof of fault. Strict 
liability offences are therefore unaffected. This article argues the law is more complex 
requiring a more careful approach. The article provides a new six-step procedure to determine 
whether involuntary intoxication is applicable and should lead to acquittal. Additionally, it 
recommends a new seventh step concerning duress. 
The orthodox view of involuntary intoxication is that normally D should be acquitted 
for offences requiring proof of fault when involuntarily intoxicated.
1
 This is because D would 
lack the required mens rea. Involuntary intoxication provides evidence for a complete 
defence for crimes of specific or basic intent where D lacks mens rea. For example, David 
Ormerod argues: ‘The offence has not been committed and there is absolutely no reason why 
the law should pretend that it has’.2  
This view of involuntary intoxication is also found in the Law Commission Report 
Intoxication and Criminal Liability.
3
 It provides the illustration that if ‘D throws a brick at V 
                                                 
1
 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 313. See 
Pearson’s Case [1835] 2 Lew. 144, 145 (‘If a party be made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is 
not responsible’) and for criticism of Pearson see Mustill LJ in R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, 367 (‘I cannot 
place reliance on this dictum as a foundation for a modern law of involuntary intoxication’ after citing Pearson).  
2
 Ibid citing Law Commission Report No. 314, para 1.22. See also Q. Haque and I. Cumming, ‘Intoxication and 
Legal Defences’, Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 9 (2003): 144 - 51, at 146. 
3
 Law Commission Report No. 314 Intoxication and Criminal Liability (TSO, London, 2009). 
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without any appreciation of the risk that V would thereby apprehend or experience an impact’ 
after D is involuntarily intoxicated, then D is not liable for any offences because D lacks the 
relevant subjective fault element.
4
 D has evidence for a complete defence due to his 
involuntary intoxication. 
However, D does not have a complete defence, but rather evidence to support a 
complete defence. Simester correctly argues: 
 
‘Intoxication, even involuntary intoxication, will never provide a defence in its own 
terms. It is never enough to claim, however convincingly, that the offending 
behaviour in issue would not have occurred but for one’s intoxicated condition’.5 
 
Involuntary intoxication can provide an evidential basis for the claim that D lacks mens rea. 
While not a defence, involuntary intoxication would provide evidence against convicting D 
for offences requiring fault. This is because D would lack mens rea or as potential evidence 
for an automatism defence where involuntary intoxication is an external factor that causes 
(non-insane) automatism.
6
 Involuntary intoxication cannot provide a full defence by itself, 
but its finding can help to establish a full defence, such as automatism.
7
 The orthodox view 
stated in summary is this: D should be acquitted for offences requiring proof of fault because 
the evidence of involuntary intoxication confirms a lack of mens rea.
8
  
                                                 
4
 See above at p. 38. 
5
 AP Simester, JR Spencer, GR Sullivan and GJ Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and 
Doctrine, 4
th
 ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2010), p. 686. See further AP Simester, ‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’, 
Criminal Law Review 3 [2009]. 
6
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 6. For a perspective from Scots Law, see JM Ross, ‘A Long Motor Run 
on a Dark Night: Reconstructing HM Advocate v Ritchie’, Edinburgh Law Review 193 (2010). For suggestions 
that involuntary intoxication is a defence, see C. Crosby, ‘Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission’, 
Journal of Criminal Law 434, 468 (2010). 
7
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 7. 
8
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, p. 328 (‘The resulting intoxication is involuntary, so D should be 
acquitted’). D is acquitted not because she is involuntarily intoxicated, but rather because the required fault 
element she cannot possess due to involuntary intoxication. D should be acquitted in these circumstances 
because of a lack of the required mens rea and not, strictly speaking, merely because D is involuntarily 
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 The problem with this view is that it does not capture the relevant legal complexity 
contributing to a mistaken understanding about involuntary intoxication and its possible 
implications for D. Involuntary intoxication is not a recognised defence and its finding cannot 
guarantee an absence of liability for every charge. Additionally, its narrow interpretation is 
subject to confirmation of involuntary intoxication in law that has escaped satisfactory 
recognition.  
The six-step procedure proposed below demonstrates how the orthodox view of the 
current law should be revised and sharpened. The reasoning process by which it might be 
concluded that D is not guilty because of involuntary intoxication has been oversimplified. 
The six-step procedure is an attempt to provide clarity to the present law.
9
 
 
SIX-STEP PROCEDURE 
Involuntary intoxication is understood narrowly and subject to an evidential burden. The Law 
Commission has noted its concerns about the ‘uncertainty’ over the ‘demarcation’ between 
involuntary and voluntary intoxication.
10
 This distinction matters: it is important that any 
finding of involuntary intoxication is clarified even if such are relatively few because of the 
scale and potential seriousness of relevant alcohol-related offences.
11
 
                                                                                                                                                        
intoxicated although the latter may often be evidence for the former. This is not always clear. See R v Kingston 
[1995] 2 AC 355. 
9
 See A Reed and N Wake, ‘Potentiate Liability and Preventing Fault Attribution: The Intoxicated “Offender” 
and Anglo-American Depecage Standardisations’, 47 John Marshall Law Review57 (2014) for an insightful 
examination of voluntary and involuntary intoxication. 
10
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 2. 
11
 For example, there were 844,000 violent incidents recorded in the 2012/13 Crime Survey for England and 
Wales where the victim believed the offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol. This accounts for nearly 
half (49%) of all violent offences committed that year. See Office for National Statistics, Crime Statistics: 
Nature of Crime tables 2012/13 – Violence, table 3.10, url: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-
statistics/nature-of-crime-tables--2011-12/index.html. See HM Government, The Government’s Alcohol 
Strategy (TSO, London, 2012), esp. pp. 6 - 9, 12 - 13. 
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The burden of proof normally rests with D.
12
 Section 6(5) of the Public Order Act 
1986 states:  
 
‘a person whose awareness is impaired by intoxication shall be taken to be aware of 
that of which he would be aware if not intoxicated, unless he shows either that his 
intoxication was not self-induced or that it was caused solely by the taking or 
administration of a substance in the course of medical treatment’.13 
 
D must ‘show’ and need not ‘prove’ involuntary intoxication.14 ‘Intoxicants’ are construed 
broadly and include alcohol, controlled substances (e.g., Librium and Valium) and illegal 
drugs (e.g., cannabis and LSD).
15
 
 The narrow construction of involuntary intoxication in law requires that we apply an 
implicit, six-step procedure to determine its applicability to the facts of a case. Each step 
should be considered in the following order. Steps are labelled as a short-hand for the key 
element in each part. This six-step procedure is designed to provide greater clarity about the 
applicability of involuntary intoxication to overcome ‘uncertainty’ over its use.16 While 
relatively rare in practice, surprisingly no similar approach has been defended to clarify its 
applicability in law.
17
 
This procedure follows a specific order: the potential relevance of the proper medical 
use of an intoxicant is applicable for determining involuntary intoxication only where 
previous steps have been addressed. The requirements of the offence type help determine 
                                                 
12
 See Law Commission recommendation that D should be presumed non-intoxicated and so D should have 
evidential burden. Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 81. 
13
 S6(5) of the Public Order Act 1986. 
14
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, p. 314 argues this gives force to Art 6(2) of the ECHR under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. See Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 83. 
15
 See Law Commission Report 314, pp. 24-25 (‘Intoxication is not just about alcohol; it encompasses ingestion 
of any intoxicating substance. This includes all drugs, whether prohibited, available on prescription or freely 
available’). 
16
 See Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 2. 
17
 See above. 
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whether further steps should be considered. Each step should be considered in the order 
presented here to determine involuntary intoxication. 
 
First Step – Offence Type 
The first step is to consider whether an offence requires proof of specific or basic intent. If 
affirmative, then we proceed to the second step. If not, then involuntary intoxication is 
inapplicable.
18
 Therefore, involuntary intoxication is irrelevant to whether D is liable for a 
strict liability offence.
19
 Involuntary intoxication can provide evidence that D lacks mens rea, 
but this is irrelevant when considering offences that lack proof of specific or basic intent. 
Involuntary intoxication can only be applicable for offences that require proof of fault. The 
first step is to confirm whether or not this is present. 
 
Second Step – Mental Functioning 
The second step is to consider next whether D suffers from a ‘disease of the mind’ within the 
M’Naughten20 Rules, such as a recognized medical condition.21 If affirmative, then 
involuntary intoxication is inapplicable although alternative defences may be available, such 
as insanity.
22
 We should proceed to the third step if this is not the case. 
                                                 
18
 An exception is where involuntary intoxication induces a state of automatism. D would have the defence of 
non-sane automatism. But see Reed and Wake, ‘Potentiate Liability and Preventing Fault Attribution’, at 77 
(‘The boundaries between automatism / involuntary intoxication are blurred’ in certain respects). 
19
 R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, 370. 
20
 R v McNaughten [1843] 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210. See DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, 501; Attorney-General for 
Northern Ireland v. Gallagher [1963] AC 349 and R v C [2013] EWC Crim 223, para. 18 (the ‘precise line 
between the law of voluntary intoxication and the law of insanity may be difficult to identify in some borderline 
cases’). For general commentary, see T. Storey, ‘The Borderline between Insanity and Intoxication’, Journal of 
Criminal Law 194. 
21
 See s. 1 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 requiring expert medical 
evidence to support insanity claims. See also Winterwerp v Netherlands [1979] 2 EHRR 387 and Dowds [2012] 
EWCA Crim 281, [2012] 1 WLR 2576 at [40] (‘The presence of a “recognised medical condition” is a 
necessary, but not always a sufficient, condition to raise the issue of diminished responsibility’). See also Dowds 
[2012] 1 WLR 2576 at [31] (‘the medial classification begs the question whether the condition is simply a 
description of (often criminal) behaviour, or is capable of forming a defence to an allegation of such’).  
22
 See Burns [1984] 79 Cr. App. R. 173 (CA). See also Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and 
Automatism. Discussion Paper (2013), 1.86 and also Reed and Wake, ‘Potentiate Liability and Preventing Fault 
Attribution’, at 83 – 99.. 
6 
 
Relevant recognized medical conditions include alcohol dependency syndrome where 
it affects D’s ability to reason at the time the actus reus of an offence was committed.23 D 
could be incapable of forming the required mens rea, but the cause would be an internal 
factor due to a disease of the mind and so D could not claim (non-insane) automatism.
24
 This 
is the case even where D’s insanity is only temporary and caused voluntarily, explained by 
Mr Justice Stephen in Davis: ‘drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which 
drunkenness leads are different things’.25 The question about D’s mental functioning in 
relation to the M’Naughten Rules is relevant after we confirm that the offence in question 
requires proof of fault in the first step.
26
 The second step concerning mental functioning 
affirms whether D lacks a recognised medical condition. This is required if involuntary 
intoxication is a possibility. 
 
Third Step - Chronology 
The third step is to consider whether D possessed mens rea before becoming involuntarily 
intoxicated. Involuntary intoxication is inapplicable if D does possess mens rea. If this is not 
the case, then we should consider the fourth step. 
The relevant chronology is important. Involuntary intoxication may render D unable 
to form mens rea, but it is no defence where mens rea is present prior to involuntary 
                                                 
23
 See DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, 500 to 501; Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 
349, 375 and 381; R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, 369 and R v C [2013] EWCA Crim 223 at [17]. 
24
 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; R v Sullivan [1983] 3 WLR 123; R v 
Hennessey [1989] 1 WLR 287. For criticisms about the internal versus external factors distinction, see J. Peay, 
‘Insanity and Automatism: Questions From and About the Law Commission’s Scoping Paper’, Criminal Law 
Review 927, 930 - 32 (2012). 
25
 (1881) 14 Cox’s Criminal Cases 563, 564 cited in Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 74. See Lord 
Birkenhead LC in Beard [1920] AC 479. 
26
 DPP v Harper, The Times, May 2, 1997. See ‘Case Comment: Driving without Due Care and Attention – 
Diabetic’, Criminal Law Review 271 (1987). For criticisms of Harper, see T. Ward, ‘Magistrates, Insanity and 
the Common Law’, Criminal Law Review 796 (1997). 
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intoxication.
27
 This is because involuntary intoxication might prevent D forming mens rea 
post-intoxication, but it does not terminate any mens rea already possessed.  
The question is whether ‘the operative fault’ is possessed by D and it would not be if 
D formed the intention after involuntary intoxication.
28
 If D possessed mens rea before 
becoming surreptitiously intoxicated by another, then the operative fault lies with D and the 
necessary fault element remains.
29
 D could not claim involuntary intoxication even though 
she may lack responsibility for becoming intoxicated. Involuntary intoxication requires that 
mens rea is not possessed prior to intoxication and any intent formed after intoxication is not 
the operative fault of D. The third step confirms this chronology. 
 
Fourth Step – Proper Medical Purpose 
The fourth step is to confirm whether the taking of an intoxicant by D is for a proper medical 
purpose. If affirmative, then D is involuntarily intoxicated in law thereby possessing 
evidential support for a defence of (non-insane) automatism. Proper medical purpose would 
include taking an intoxicant on instruction by a medical professional.
30
 Medically prescribed 
intoxicants must be taken as instructed.
31
 D would be involuntarily intoxicated because 
intoxication is by directed instruction from a medical professional. Improper medical 
purposes might negate involuntary intoxication, such as taking an intoxicant prescribed to 
another or failing to take the correct dosage. This finding requires each preceding step is 
                                                 
27
 R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, [1994] 3 WLR 519. See GR Sullivan, ‘Making Excuses’, in A. Smith and G. 
Sullivan (eds), Harm and Culpability 131-34 (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
28
 See Lord Taylor of Gosforth in R v Kingston [1994] QB 81, 89-90 cited by Mustill LJ in Kingston [1995] 2 
AC 355, 362-63. 
29
 See Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 7 note 33. 
30
 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, 471 - 72, 475. See Quick [1973] QB 910, 922 - 23. The Law Commission 
recommends this should be understood more narrowly and limited to where D takes ‘a properly authorised or 
licensed medicine or drug (for a proper medical purpose) in accordance with: (1) advice given by a suitably 
qualified person (such as a general practitioner or pharmacist; and/or (2) the instructions accompanying the 
medicine or drug (such as a printed leaflet)’. Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 79. 
31
 R v C [2013] EWC Crim 223, paras. 19, 31. 
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satisfied: the offence type requires proof of specific or basic intent, D does not suffer from a 
disease of the mind and D did not possess mens rea before intoxication.  
This fourth step concerns whether D took an intoxicant for a proper medical purpose. 
If D did not, then we should proceed to consider a fifth step. D may be found involuntarily 
intoxicated, but this requires further consideration. 
 
Fifth Step - Knowledge 
The fifth step is to consider whether D was aware he took an intoxicant prior to involuntary 
intoxication. D is involuntary intoxicated if he is not and this provides evidential support for a 
defence of (non-insane) automatism. This conclusion requires each of the previous steps has 
been passed, e.g., the offence requires proof of specific or basic intent, D does not suffer a 
disease of the mind, D does not possess mens rea before intoxication and D’s taking of an 
intoxicant was not subject to its proper medical purpose.  
Self-induced intoxication is normally held to be voluntary intoxication.
32
 D is 
involuntarily intoxicated when D lacks awareness of taking an intoxicant. D would not be 
involuntarily intoxicated if he had knowledge of taking an intoxicant: this is the case even if 
the intoxicant had been spiked to render it more potent.
 33
 
If D was aware of taking an intoxicant, then we proceed to a final, sixth step to 
determine if D is involuntarily intoxicated. Knowledge of taking an intoxicant may not negate 
fault because ‘a drunken intent is nevertheless an intent’34 and even where involuntarily 
taken.
35
 Lord Hughes states in C that  
 
                                                 
32
 R v Quick [1973] QB 910. See also at 922 (‘A self-induced incapacity will not usually excuse nor will one 
which could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as for 
example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, or failing to have regular 
meals whilst taking insulin’). 
33
 R v Allen [1988] Criminal Law Review 698. 
34
 R v Sheehan [1975] 1 WLR 739 and R v Heard [2007] 3 All ER 306. 
35
 See JR Spencer, ‘Involuntary Intoxication as a Defence’, 54 Cambridge Law Journal 12 (1995). 
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‘The law refuses as a matter of policy to afford a general defence to an offender on 
the basis of his own voluntary intoxication. The pressing social reasons for 
maintaining this general policy of the law are certainly no less present in modern 
conditions of substance abuse than they were in the past’.36 
 
If D is found voluntarily intoxicated, then there would be no evidential basis for a complete 
defence of (non-insanity) automatism. Intoxication might still be a defence to crimes of 
specific intent.
37
 This is because automatism is incompatible with voluntariness. If 
intoxication is self-induced knowingly, then D will normally be considered voluntarily, not 
involuntarily, intoxicated.
 38
 This is explained by the Law Commission: ‘The policy for this is 
readily understood: while it may be fair for a person to be acquitted where he or she 
completely lost control of his or her actions, it is not fair for there to be an acquittal where the 
accused may be blamed for whatever led to the loss of control’.39 
 It should be noted that the law on this point has attracted criticism. The Law 
Commission recommends an important revision where we consider the ‘self-induced aspect’ 
of D’s intoxication versus any unknown external factors. 40 If D consumes one alcoholic drink 
that she believes is a glass of wine, but unaware that this drink has been surreptitiously spiked 
with a powerful hallucinogenic drug the current law would find D is voluntarily intoxicated. 
The Law Commission revision recommends we weigh and compare what D knowingly 
consumes against what D does not. If the ‘self-induced aspect’ is ‘insignificant’ in contrast 
with an unknown external factor, then D could claim involuntary intoxication despite 
knowingly taking an intoxicant.
41
 There is also authority for this position in Scots law.
42
 The 
                                                 
36
 R v C [2013] EWCA Crim 233 at [17], [2013] All ER (D) 06 (Apr). 
37
 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443. See Simester, ‘Intoxication is never a defence’, Criminal Law Review 4 – 5. 
38
 See Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 6. 
39
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 24. 
40
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 78. 
41
 See above. 
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evidential burden would remain on D and this might address the concern that this could be 
easy to claim, but difficult to disprove.
43
  
Nonetheless, there is likely to be resistance from the government because of the—
citing Lord Hughes in C—the ‘pressing social reasons for maintaining this general policy’.44 
Amending this policy would likely make prosecutions more difficult to secure because D 
could attempt a defence and render outcomes less certain. While the Law Commission has 
recommended reforming the automatism defence, it has resisted extending reforms to include 
a change of where D ‘may have become incapable of effective control of his or her actions at 
the time of the alleged offence’ as a result of ‘voluntary intoxication’.45 
 The fifth step considers whether D was unaware of taking an intoxicant prior to 
involuntary intoxication and, if so, this provides evidential support for a defence of (non-
insane) automatism. 
 
Sixth Step – Risk Appreciation 
The final step concerns risk appreciation. We consider whether D was able to appreciate the 
risks from taking an intoxicant. If D is able to appreciate the relevant risks, then D is not 
involuntarily intoxicated. Otherwise, D may claim involuntarily intoxication—and this test is 
fairly strict. Normally, D is held voluntarily intoxicated where D has knowledge of taking an 
intoxicant and it is irrelevant whether the amount consumed or its effect was 
underestimated.
46
 An exception is made where D suffers an unpredictable, aberrant reaction 
of a particular kind.  
                                                                                                                                                        
42
 Ross v HM Advocate (Scotland) [1991] SLT 564. 
43
 For criticisms, see Kingston [1995] 2 ACC 355, 376 - 77. 
44
 R v C [2013] EWCA Crim 233 at [17], [2013] All ER (D) 06 (Apr). See T. Brooks (eds), Alcohol and Public 
Policy (Routledge, 2014).  
45
 Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 40. 
46
 Allen [1988] Criminal Law Review 698. 
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 This exception can take two forms. The first is ‘‘pathological intoxication’47 where 
taking alcohol might activate latent epilepsy or other conditions. This form of intoxication is 
considered a form of insanity.
48
 D would be held insane and not involuntarily intoxicated. 
This could only be where internal factors are found to be applicable to determining liability 
and not external factors. 
 An exception may also exist in a second form where ‘soporific or sedative’ drugs 
have been taken, such as morphine or Valium. One example is Burns
49
 where D took 
morphine for a stomach complaint without a medical prescription before being convicted. D’s 
conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeals which held the jury should have been 
directed to acquit if it believed D did not appreciate that morphine was likely to produce 
unawareness.
50
 A second example is Hardie
51
 where D took non-prescribed Valium tablets 
before committing acts of criminal damage. Parker LJ said: 
 
‘There was no evidence that it was known to [D] or even generally known that the 
taking of Valium in the quantity taken would be liable to render a person aggressive 
or incapable of appreciating risks or have other side effects such that its self-
administration would itself have an element of recklessness. It is true that Valium is a 
drug and it is true that it was taken deliberately and not taken on medical prescription, 
but the drug is, in our view, wholly different in kind from drugs which are likely to 
cause unpredictability or aggressiveness . . . [The jury] should have been directed that 
if they came to the conclusion that, as a result of the Valium, [D] was, at the time, 
                                                 
47
 See DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 433, 466, 468-70, 487. 
48
 See R. D. Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law 165-69 (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
and Simester, et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, p. 696n160. See also DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 
433, 470. 
49
 [1974] 58 Cr App R 364. 
50
 See above. 
51
 [1985] 1 WLR 64. 
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unable to appreciate the risks to property and persons from his actions they should 
consider whether the taking of the Valium was itself reckless’.52 
 
The perception of appreciated risk was found essential to finding recklessness.
53
 If D was 
able to appreciate potential risks, then D may be found reckless and unable to claim 
involuntary intoxication. However, if potential risks are unable to be appreciated, then D may 
be found involuntarily intoxicated.  
The only relevant intoxicants for consideration are morphine and Valium.
54
 If D is 
unable to appreciate potential risks of taking any other type of sedative, then there is no clear 
and existing authority in law for finding D involuntarily intoxicated if D’s taking of this 
sedative was not reckless. It could be argued that other sedatives with similar known effects 
should be included to enable greater consistency, but there may be a more compelling 
counterargument to reform the law. This is because these and other intoxicants have become 
more widely used over the past 30 years that raise important questions about, for example, 
whether Valium’s possible effects are not generally known.55  
 
DURESS: A SEVENTH STEP? 
This article argues there is a six-step procedure to clarify findings of involuntary intoxication. 
Additional steps are unnecessary under the present law although they may be recommended 
for future legal reform of the law on involuntary intoxication. One recommendation worth 
examining is a possible seventh step of ‘Duress’.  
Recall that the sixth step considers whether D was able to appreciate the risks from 
taking an intoxicant. D is involuntarily intoxicated if not, but D is otherwise not involuntarily 
                                                 
52
 R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64, 69 - 70. 
5353
 See Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760. 
54
 Burns [1974] 58 Cr App R 364 and Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64. 
55
 See R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64, 69 (Valium’s effects were not ‘even generally known). 
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intoxicated and this exhausts the legal possibility of D’s being involuntarily intoxicated. It 
might be argued that a seventh step should be considered to consider whether D became 
intoxicated through a narrow construction of duress. 
To be clear: this is not the current law. However, there is support for this position that 
can be found in other jurisdictions. For example, there is US authority in Burrows
56
 where D 
killed V after V insisted he drink several bottles of beer and some whiskey.
57
 If D responds 
reasonably to a threat by V which involves D’s having become intoxicated, then a case for 
duress might be made. The current law requires that D’s intoxication must not be self-
induced if D wishes to claim the defence of duress.
58
 A seventh step would require an 
exemption for where D is self-induced into intoxication under duress. 
The arguments for this reform are that a sufficiently high threshold for any successful 
claim of duress might be secured. This is because six steps must be considered before taking 
any possible duress into account. This places real constraints on the permissible cases for 
consideration of involuntary intoxication by duress. Additionally, the evidential burden 
would remain on D which might further secure this high threshold limiting the potential 
number of relevant cases.  
The argument against this change might include a concern that this reform could 
create new inconsistencies in how the law responds to claims of duress. If D would continue 
to be unable to claim a duress defence because of self-induced intoxication, then it might be 
inconsistent to permit D to claim involuntary intoxication after passing a duress step which, 
in turn, would then provide evidence to support a complete defence of (non-insane) 
automatism. Furthermore, the defence duress is not available to D for certain offences, such 
as murder. If D could claim involuntary intoxication after passing a duress test, then D could 
                                                 
56
 Burrows v State, 38 Ariz 99, 297 (1931) (Arizona). 
57
 See Jacqueline Martin and Tony Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law, 3
rd
 ed. (Oxford: Hodder & Stoughton, 
2010), p. 241. 
58
 See R v Flatt [1996] Criminal Law Review 576 (CA) and R v Bowen [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 157, 166. 
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claim a defence of (non-sane) automatism which is a complete defence to murder and this is 
highly unlikely to win support from Parliament.
59
 
This article recommends this legal reform about how involuntary intoxication should 
be determined. One possible argument against this reform is that a seventh step of duress 
would apply to most, but not all, criminal offences and so its application would be 
inconsistent. While a new step of duress might not be applicable in determining involuntary 
intoxication for offences like murder, this is consistent with the limits of applying duress 
more generally. This new step might reform how we determine where D is involuntary 
intoxicated, but not by changing how we understand duress.  
Additionally, a new step of duress would not render a finding of involuntary 
intoxication incoherent. This is because D would not be voluntarily choosing to consume an 
intoxicant, but only doing so under coercion. This will place a special burden on D to 
establish that his intoxication was a cause of duress which appears appropriate given that, if 
established, it could lead to an acquittal.
60
 
 
CONCLUSION  
The orthodox view is that D should be acquitted for fault based offences if he is involuntarily 
intoxicated. This view should be revised because the law is more complex.
61
 The law does 
not generally excuse an internal cause for an irresistible impulse and so neither should it 
excuse such an impulse caused by external factor.
62
 The orthodox view requires revision 
                                                 
59
 It is worth noting that removing this exception for murder and similarly serious offences might lack sufficient 
public support.   
60
 This article does not argue that additional steps could be recommended. 
61
 This complexity is compounded when we consider related issues pertaining to voluntary intoxication. 
62
 See R v Kingston [1995] 2 ACC 355, 367, 376-77. See Spencer, ‘Involuntary Intoxication As a Defence’, 13 
(‘The law does not recognise irresistible impulse as a defence if it arises from blameless internal causes like 
brain tumours or hormone imbalance, and this it can hardly recognise irresistible impulse arising from 
involuntary intoxication’). 
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because it does not capture the narrow contours of the applicability of involuntary 
intoxication.  
This article identifies a six-step procedure we should apply to determine where 
involuntary intoxication may be applicable. It is suggested that the law is not inconsistent 
(with the possible exception of the sixth step), but it has been unclear.
63
 The six-step 
procedure provides a useful approach for applying the law with greater clarity and 
consistency. Many offences are committed under the influence of intoxicants. This raises a 
problem: it could be easy for D to claim involuntary intoxication and difficult for the 
prosecution to disprove it. This may explain the evidential burden on D to substantiate any 
claim by D of involuntary intoxication.
64
 This burden may make involuntary intoxication 
more difficult to claim successfully, but this may be unproblematic in light of the facts that 
(a) a successful claim may justify the complete defence of (non-insane) automatism and (b) 
alternative defences may remain available so the narrow construction of involuntary 
intoxication need not close off other possibilities.  
This article argues for a reform of the current law to include a new seventh step of 
duress. Involuntary intoxication by duress can be found in other jurisdictions and should be 
included here. This reform would change how we confirm whether D is involuntarily 
intoxicated, but not how we understand and apply duress. Nor would this reform render 
incoherent the idea of involuntary intoxication. 
Perhaps the biggest problem of all is determining if D was involuntarily intoxicated. 
This article revises the orthodox view by providing a six-step procedure consistent with the 
                                                 
63
 The law might also appear counterintuitive in finding D potentially liable for most kinds of situations where D 
is non-voluntarily intoxicated, a perspective often expressed by non-lawyers. It might be replied that non-
voluntary intoxication may justify a reduced sentence if D is convicted. See Law Commission Report No. 314, 
p. 88. See also at p. 91 citing Mustill, LJ in R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, 377: ‘the interplay between the 
wrong done to the victim, the individual characteristics and frailties of the defendant, and the pharmacological 
effects of whatever drug may be potentially involved can be far better recognised by a tailored choice form the 
continuum of sentences available to the judge’. 
64
 See Law Commission Report No. 314, p. 89. 
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current law that makes clear the existing legal complexity and why the inclusion of a new 
seventh step of duress is coherent with it.
65
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